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Abstract
A theory T is trustworthy iff, whenever a theory U is interpretable in T , then it is faithfully
interpretable. In this paper we give a characterization of trustworthiness. We provide a simple proof
of Friedman’s Theorem that finitely axiomatized, sequential, consistent theories are trustworthy. We
provide an example of a theory whose schematic predicate logic is complete Π 02 .
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1. Introduction
We begin with a definition.
Definition 1.1. A theory T is trustworthy if every U interpretable in T is also faithfully
interpretable in T . 
Thus, our trustworthiness is the trustworthiness of someone who is, whenever he is able to
tell a story at all, able to tell it without false embellishments. Trustworthiness is a peculiar
notion that has nothing to do with strength. It has to do with the constraint a theory puts
on the available linguistic resources. In Section 6 we will probe deeper into the true and
proper nature of trustworthiness.
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This paper is a study of trustworthiness. We aim to show that the notion of
trustworthiness is interesting both in its own right and by its connection to other notions.
1.1. Contents of the paper
Three central results form the core of the paper. The first is a characterization of
trustworthiness. This characterization is provided in Section 5.
As the second central result, we will reprove Friedman’s Theorem concerning
trustworthiness. The theorem is reported in [12, Theorem 3, on p. 224]. The theorem
states that finitely axiomatized, adequate (sequential)1, consistent theories are trustworthy.
The proof of the result is provided in Section 5. Friedmans’ Theorem will be proved as a
consequence of our characterization and of a theorem that is proved in Section 4. In fact,
the results of Section 4 make a strengthening of Friedman’s result possible.
Our third central result is the description of trustworthiness in terms of an adjunction
between the preorder of faithful interpretability and the preorder of interpretability. This
result is proved in Section 6.
An important method used in the paper is the use of the FGH Theorem, which
approximately says that we can prove the following principle in Elementary Arithmetic.
Let T be a theory into which a suitable fragment of Arithmetic can be interpreted. Then,
for any Σ 01 -sentence S, there is a Σ
0
1 -sentence R, such that (S ∨ incon(T )) is equivalent to
✷T R. I.o.w., if T is consistent then S is equivalent to a T -provability statement. Since the
FGH Theorem plays such an important role, I devote Section 3 to an extensive discussion
of it and its applications.
A side result with some independent interest is contained in Appendix C. We give an
example of a theory whose schematic logic is complete Π 02 .
1.2. Prerequisites
Most of what is needed to understand the paper is contained in the textbook [4].
1.3. History of the paper
The present paper is a sequel of [19]. In that work a somewhat sharper version of
Theorem 4.1 of the present paper was proved. The present proof is, however, considerably
simpler. The article [19], was the result of reflecting on the paper [6]. In that paper Krajı´cˇek
studies Viteslav ˇSvejdar’s question “When is it consistent for inconsistency proofs to lie
between cuts?”. In other words, for which theories T and for which T -cuts I and J is
the theory T + conJ (T ) + inconI (T ) consistent? Krajı´cˇek proves that, for every finitely
axiomatized, sequential and consistent theory T , and for every T -cut I , we can find a T -cut
J such that ˇSvejdar’s question has a positive answer for T , I and J .
Neither Krajı´cˇek nor I noted that Krajı´cˇek’s Theorem is an immediate consequence
of Friedman’s Theorem on trustworthiness.2 I only realized this recently after Harvey
Friedman reminded me of his result in e-mail correspondence. It turns out that, in the other
1 We will use sequential instead of adequate in this paper.
2 See Remark 5.7 of the present paper.
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direction, the methods of [19] yield a proof of Friedman’s Theorem. This paper reports this
proof.
2. Arithmetization
In this section we introduce some basic notions and conventions.
2.1. Theories and interpretations
Theories in this paper are theories of first order predicate logic. Unless stated otherwise,
we will assume that theories have an axiom set that is p-time decidable. Interpretations
between theories are relative interpretations. For a description of the notion of relative
interpretation, see the classical [15], or e.g. [20]. We write:
• K : T ✄U , for: K is an interpretation of U in T .
• T ✄U , for ∃K K:T ✄U .
We will be interested in theories in which a sufficiently large fragment of arithmetic is
relatively interpretable. Let us fix a weak, finitely axiomatized, arithmetical theory F. This
theory has as language, the arithmetical language with 0, S,+,×,≤. The theory F is
axiomatized by Robinson’s Arithmetic Q plus axioms that ≤, is linear, plus the axiom
x ≤ Sy ↔ (x ≤ y∨ x = Sy).3 We use F instead of Q, because it is pleasant to have some
important properties of the Rosser ordering in one’s simplest theory.
The theory F is interpretable in Q on a definable initial segment I . See [4, pp. 366–371].
We comment on some details in our Appendix D.
To numerize a theory T is to specify an interpretation N such that N : T ✄ F. Thus,
a theory T is numerizable if T ✄ F. We will also need the notion of numerized theory. A
numerized theory T is a pair 〈T,N 〉, where N : T ✄ F. The numerized theory 〈T,N 〉 is
a numerization of the numerizable theory T . In the context of numerized theories T , the
variables x, y, z, . . . will range over the numbers provided by N . Thus, e.g. ∀x . . . will
mean ∀x (δN (x)→ . . .). We will use ξ, η, . . . for general variables. We will write T + A
for 〈T + A,N 〉, etc.
We will be sloppy between numerizable and numerized in the case of ‘explicitly
arithmetical’ theories, like PA. Officially, PA is a numerizable theory. However, we will
confuse it with the numerized theory 〈PA, id〉, where id is the identity interpretation.
We will fix an arithmetization of metamathematical notions in the language of F. The
arithmetization is supposed to be efficient so that we can verify all relevant facts in Buss’
S12. See e.g. [1] or [4].4 We will write ✷U A (✷U A), for provU (#A) (provU (#A)). The
use of ✷U (✷U ) will be only meaningful inside a numerized theory T = 〈T,N 〉. The
formalization of an outer ✷ will always be in the designated numbers given by N . So
✷U A will be a different formula inside 〈T,N 〉 than inside 〈T,K〉, ifN andK are different.
3 Our version of Robinson’s Arithmetic has ≤ as an atomic symbol and includes the axiom y ≤ x
↔ ∃z z + y = x . See Appendix D.
4 As is well known, we can replace S12 by a variant in the arithmetical language. We assume we are working
with this variant.
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Boxes inside boxes will take their numerization from the numerized theory corresponding
to the first box above in the parse tree. In Appendix A this convention is made precise. The
convention is best illustrated by some examples.
Example 2.1. Suppose T = 〈T,N 〉 and U = 〈T,K〉 are numerized theories.
• ‘T  ∀ξ ∃y Q(ξ, y)’, where Q is an atomic predicate, means:
T  ∀ξ ∃η (δN (η) ∧ Q(ξ, η)).
• ‘T  ✷U ∀ξ ∃y R(ξ, y)’, where R is an atomic predicate, means:
T  ✷NU ∀ξ ∃η (δK(η) ∧ R(ξ, η)).
• ‘T  ✷U A → ✷U B’ is meaningless. There is nothing to tell us from which set of
numbers to take the witnesses for ✷U .
• ‘T  ✷U A → ✷U B’ is meaningless. The witnesses for outer ✷’s must come from the
numerization of T .
• ‘T  ✷U A → ✷U B’ means: T  ✷NU A → ✷NU B (for A and B without boxes or
numerical variables).
• ‘T  ✷U A → ✷U✷U A’ is meaningless. Where could the witnesses for the last ✷U
come from?
• ‘T  ✷U A → ✷U✷U A’ means: T  ✷NU A → ✷NU ✷KU A (for A without boxes or
numerical variables). 
Schematic letters A, B , range over the expanded language with boxes and two kinds of
variables or over the original language. Schematic letters forΣ 01 -formulas receive the same
treatment as boxed formulas: they range over Σ 01 -formulas relativized to the stipulated
numbers.
Free variables in a formula inside a ✷ will be treated according to the usual convention
so that they are still free in the resulting formula. Thus, A(x) inside a box will really stand
for a term that defines the following function: we map the number n to Go¨delnumber of
the result of substituting the (binary) numeral n of n for x in A.5
There are various orderings for interpretations of F in a numerizable theory T . The one
that is relevant for us is given as follows.
• E : K ≤T N iff E is a T -formula which T -provably gives an initial embedding of the
K-numbers into the N -numbers. We omit the subscript if the theory is clear from the
context.
We give the clauses for E . To increase readability we use Plus for + and Times for ×.
(1) T  ∀ξ ∀η (E(ξ, η)→ (δK(ξ) ∧ δN (η))),
(2) T  ∀ξ (δK(ξ) → ∃η (δN (η) ∧ E(ξ, η))),
(3) T  ∀ξ ∀η ((E(ξ, η) ∧ η′ ≤N η)→ ∃ξ ′ (E(ξ ′, η′) ∧ ξ ′ ≤K ξ)),
(4) T  ∀ξ ∀ξ ′ ∀η ∀η′ ((E(ξ, η) ∧ E(ξ ′, η′) ∧ ξ =K ξ ′)→ η =N η′),
(5) T  ∀ξ ∀ξ ′ ∀η ∀η′ ((E(ξ, η) ∧ E(ξ ′, η′) ∧ SK(ξ, ξ ′))→ SN (η, η′)),
5 The ‘term’ mentioned here need not be really a term, but can be given as a suitable formula of which the
theory proves that it behaves in the desired way.
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(6) T  ∀ξ ∀ξ ′ ∀ξ ′′ ∀η ∀η′ ∀η′′ ((E(ξ, η) ∧ E(ξ ′, η′) ∧ E(ξ ′′, η′′) ∧
PlusK(ξ, ξ ′, ξ ′′))→ PlusN (η, η′, η′′)),
(7) T  ∀ξ ∀ξ ′ ∀ξ ′′ ∀η ∀η′ ∀η′′ ((E(ξ, η) ∧ E(ξ ′, η′) ∧ E(ξ ′′, η′′) ∧
TimesK(ξ, ξ ′, ξ ′′))→ TimesN (η, η′, η′′)).
Any provably initial embedding E : K → N can be split into two parts: E0 : K → I ,
and emb : I → N . Here E0 is a provable isomorphism and I is an initial segment of the
N -numbers, satisfying F. The embedding emb is the identical embedding of I intoN . We
will call such an initial segment of N satisfying F a T -cut of N . If we are considering a
numerized theory T = 〈T,N 〉, then we will call a T -cut ofN simply a T -cut.
A sequential theory is a theory with a good notion of sequence for all objects of the
domain of the theory. This notion is due to Pavel Pudla´k. See e.g. [10], or [4, p. 151]. The
notion of sequential theory is equivalent to Harvey Friedman’s notion of adequate theory.
See [12]. A sequential theory is always numerizable. Here are a few facts about≤ and cuts.
Fact 2.2. Consider a numerizable theory T . The variables K, M, N will range over
interpretations of F.
(1) For any numerized theory T = 〈T,N 〉, there is a T -cut I , such that, for standard
k, T  ∀x∈I ∃y itexp(x, k) = y. Here, itexp(x, 0) := x and itexp(x,m + 1) :=
2itexp(x,m). This theorem is due to Robert Solovay (in an unpublished manuscript “On
Interpretability in Set Theories”). Later a sharper version was proved in [10]:
S12  ∀z ∃I ✷T ∀x∈I ∃y itexp(x, |z|) = y. Here |n| = entier(2 log(n)). Thus |n| is
the binary length of n.
(2) For any numerized theory T = 〈T,N 〉, there is a T -cut I , such that I : T ✄ (I∆0 +
Ω1). Since I is a cut, Π 01 -sentences are downwards preserved from N to I and Σ 01 -
sentences are upwards preserved from I to N . This theorem is due to Alex Wilkie.
See [4, pp. 366–369]. See also our remarks in Appendix D.
(3) Suppose that T is sequential. Then, for all M, N , there is a K with K ≤ M and
K ≤ N . This theorem is due to Pavel Pudla´k [10].6 Note that, by (2), we can always
assume that K : T ✄ I∆0 + Ω1.
(4) Suppose I is a T -cut. Then we have: S12  ∀x ✷T x ∈ I . This theorem is the obis-
principle. It shows that numbers that are big outside are always small inside. The result
is proved e.g. in [22].
Remark 2.3. Consider a numerized theory T = 〈T,N 〉. Let I, J range over T -cuts. We
can assign an invariant to T as follows:
li(T ) := {A | ∃I ∀J≤I T  AJ }.
Here li stands for ‘limes inferior’. It is easily seen that, if T is consistent, then li(T ) is also
consistent. One can show that li(T ) extends the theory I∆0 + BΣ 01 + {conn(F) | n ∈ ω}.
Here BΣ 01 is the Σ
0
1 -collection principle:
 ∀x≤a ∃y S0(y)→ ∃b ∀x≤a ∃y≤b S0(y),
6 Our statement is not precisely Pudla´k’s, who considers a numerized theory and takes K to be a cut of the
designated numbers. The two statements are easily seen to be equivalent.
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where S0 ∈ ∆0. The formula conn stands for consistency w.r.t. n-provability. (See
Section 4, for further explanation.)
In case T is sequential, by Fact 2.2(3), li(T ) will be independent of the numerization T
of T . Thus, we may write li(T ), when T is sequential. For sequential theories T and U , we
find the following.
(1) li(T ) extends I∆0 + BΣ 01 + {conn(T ) | n ∈ ω}.
(2) If li(T ) ⊆ li(U), then T is locally interpretable in U .
(3) If T is finitely axiomatized and consistent, then li(T ) is Σ 01 -sound. (This follows from
Theorem 4.1.) 
Open Question 2.4. Remark 2.3 suggests the following questions. What are the possible
complexities of the li’s? Do we have, for sequential T and U , that if T is interpretable in
U , then li(T ) ⊆ li(U)? 
2.2. Preliminaries to Rosser arguments
Suppose A = ∃x A0(x) and B = ∃x B0(x). Here A0 and B0 are arbitrary formulas of
the language of some numerized theory T = 〈T,N 〉. Remember that x and y range over
theN -numbers. We write:
• A ≤ B :↔ ∃x (A0(x) ∧ ∀y < x ¬ B0(y)),
• A < B :↔ ∃x (A0(x) ∧ ∀y ≤ x ¬ B0(y)),
• If C = (A ≤ B), we write C⊥ for (B < A). If D = (A < B), we write D⊥ for
(B ≤ A).
Formulas of the form A ≤ B and A < B are called witness comparison formulas. The
witness comparison notation was introduced by David Guaspari around 1976. They were
first systematically studied in [3].
We present some facts about witness comparison formulas.
Fact 2.5. We have:
(1) T  A ≤ B → A.
(2) T  A < B → A ≤ B.
(3) T  A ≤ B → ¬ (B < A).
(4) T  (A ≤ B ∧ B ≤ C)→ A ≤ C.
(5) T  A ≤ A → (A ≤ B ∨ B < A).
(6) T  (A ∧ ¬ B)→ A < B.
(7) T  ((A → A ≤ A) ∧ B)→ (A ≤ B ∨ B < A).
(8) T  (A < B ∨ B ≤ A)↔ (A ≤ B ∨ B < A).
Proof. We prove (5). Reason in T . Suppose A ≤ A. This tells us that {x | A0(x)} has a
smallest element, say x0. We have ∀y<x0 ¬ B0(y) or ∃y<x0 B0(y). In the first case, we
find A ≤ B , in the second, B < A. 
In I∆0, we can prove the∆0-minimum principle. So, I∆0  S → S ≤ S, for S ∈ ∃∆0. In
fact, ∆0-induction is equivalent to this principle, assuming we allow free parameters in S.
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Similarly, Buss’ theory T12 proves the Σ b1 -minimum principle.7 So, T12  S → S ≤ S,
for S ∈ ∃Σ b1 . In fact, Σ b1 -IND is equivalent to this principle, assuming we allow free
parameters in S. (See [1, p. 61, Theorem 24].) Thus, we can draw the following corollary
from Fact 2.5(5, 7).
Corollary 2.6. Let S be ∃∆0 [∃Σ b1 ]. Suppose that N : T ✄ I∆0 [N : T ✄ T12]. Then,T  (S ∨ A)→ (S ≤ A ∨ A < S).
Note that it follows, from the conclusion of Corollary 2.6, by substituting S for A, that
T  S → S ≤ S, which expresses the ∆0-minimum principle [Σ b1 -minimum principle],
and hence ∆0-induction [Σ b1 -IND]. If, in the Σ b1 -case, we could prove our corollary using
S12, it would follow that T12 = S12, deciding an open problem. However, we can prove a
related fact for S12, which is sufficient for some important applications.
Fact 2.7. Let T be a numerized theory. Let ✷ := ✷T . Suppose that S is ∃Σ b1 and that
A = ∃x A0(x). We have S12  S → ✷(S ≤ S), and, hence, S12  S → ✷(S ≤ A∨A < S).
Proof. Reason in S12. Suppose S. By Σ b1 -completeness, we find ✷S0(x), for some x .
By the obis-principle, we find ✷SI , for any T -definable cut I . By Fact 2.2(2), we can
pick I such that it satisfies I∆0 + Ω1.8 It follows that in ✷(S ≤ S)I and, thus,
✷(S ≤ S). 
The following fact is, modulo some insignificant differences, verified in [16].
Fact 2.8 (Small Reflection Principle). Let T = 〈T,N 〉 be a sequential numerized theory.
Suppose that T is either finitely axiomatized or an extension by finitely many axioms of
I∆0 + Ω1 (relativized to N ). Let ✷ := ✷T . Let S be ∃Σ b1 . Let A be any sentence in the
language of T . We have:
S12  S → ✷(✷A ≤ S → A).
We finish this section by providing a verification of Rosser’s Theorem in S12 for theories
finitely axiomatized over either S12 or I∆0+Ω1. The idea of this argument is due to Viteslav
ˇSvejdar [14].
Theorem 2.9 (Fast Rosser Theorem). Let T be a sequential numerized theory. Suppose
that T is either finitely axiomatized or an extension by finitely many axioms of I∆0 + Ω1
(relativized to N ). Let ✷ := ✷T . Let R be such that S12  R ↔ ✷¬R ≤ ✷R. We have:
S12  (✷R ∨✷¬R) → ✷⊥.
Proof. Reason in S12. Suppose (a)✷R. By Fact 2.8, we have (b)✷((✷¬R ≤ ✷R) → ¬R).
By Fact 2.7, we have (c) ✷((✷¬R ≤ ✷R) ∨ (✷R < ✷¬R)). Combining (b) and (c), we
find: (d) ✷¬R. Combining (a) and (d), we get ✷⊥. The proof from the assumption ✷¬R
is similar. 
7 For a description of T12, see [1] or [4].8 In fact, we need only a sufficiently large finite fragment of I∆0 +Ω1 here.
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Note that it follows, by Buss’s results, that there is a p-time transformation of a proof of R
to a proof of ⊥, and, similarly, for proofs of ¬R.
Open Question 2.10. The restriction on the theories of Theorem 2.9 is somewhat
unsatisfactory. So one might ask whether the theorem also holds for non-sequential theories
or for sequential theories that are not either finitely axiomatized or finitely axiomatized as
extensions of I∆0 + Ω1.
It is well known that, if S12 did prove “NP=co-NP”, then the usual formalization of
Rosser’s Theorem would work. Thus, a negative answer to our question would entail:
S12  NP=co-NP. 
3. A miraculous argument
Sometimes, in mathematics, we meet an argument that is utterly simple, and, yet, has
many surprising consequences. The reasoning leading to the FGH Theorem surely qualifies
as an example of such an argument. It is a Rosser type argument and, thus, it inherits the
inherent mystery of such arguments. It is a simple Rosser type argument, not much more
complicated in terms of number of steps than Rosser’s original argument, even simpler in
terms of the definition of the fixed point. However, the formalization of the FGH Theorem
seems to ask for more resources than the formalization of Rosser’s, as will be explained
below.
3.1. The FGH Theorem
Let us first state the FGH Theorem. Let EA be Elementary Arithmetic, i.e. I∆0 + exp.
This theory is called EFA in [12].
Theorem 3.1 (FGH). Consider any numerized theory T = 〈T,N 〉. Let ✷ := ✷T . Let S
be Σ 01 and let R be such that Q  R ↔ S ≤ ✷R. We have:
EA  (S ∨✷⊥) ↔ (R ∨ ✷⊥)
↔ ✷R
or, equivalently, EA+ con(T )  (S ↔ R) ∧ (S ↔ ✷R).
‘FGH’ stands for Friedman–Goldfarb–Harrington. The history is as follows. Around 1976
or very early 1977, Harrington proved a principle very close to the FGH principle. The
main difference was that Harrington’s sentence R was Π 01 and not Σ
0
1 . Harvey Friedman
saw Harrington’s result and realized that one can also get the result for R in Σ 01 . He wrote
down his result in a manuscript “Proof Theoretic Degrees”, dated February 1977. An early
paper reporting the result is [11, p. 366]. Smoryn´ski refers to Friedman’s unpublished
manuscript.
Warren Goldfarb rediscovered the principle independently in November 1980. He
communicated the result to George Boolos. Subsequently, Boolos promulgated it to the
logic of provability community. Via this channel I learned of it. So I called it Goldfarb’s
Principle. I guess everyone gets due credit in my new name for it: The FGH Theorem. Here
is the proof.
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Proof. Reason in EA.
Step 1. Suppose S∨✷⊥. We want to derive R∨✷⊥. If we have✷⊥, we are done. Suppose
S. It follows that R ∨ R⊥. In the first case, we are again done. In case we have R⊥, we
find (a) ✷R, since R⊥ = (✷R < S). Moreover, by Σ 01 -completeness, we have (b) ✷R⊥.
Combining (a) and (b), we obtain ✷⊥.
Step 2. Suppose R ∨ ✷⊥. By Σ 01 -completeness, we find ✷R ∨✷⊥, hence, ✷R.
Step 3. Suppose✷R. We want to derive R∨✷⊥. We find: R∨ R⊥. Now we may proceed
as in step 1.
Step 4. Suppose R ∨ ✷⊥. We may immediately conclude that S ∨ ✷⊥. 
Remark 3.2. We can also prove EA  ✷¬R⊥ ↔ ✷R. Right-to-left is trivial. In the other
direction, let I be a T -cut satisfying I∆0 + Ω1. We have:
EA  ✷¬R⊥ → ✷(¬R⊥)I
→ ✷(✷R → R)I
→ ✷(✷I R → RI )
→ ✷(✷I R → R)
→ ✷R.
The last step is an application of Lo¨b’s Theorem for 〈T, I 〉. For a discussion of Lo¨b’s
Theorem with shifting interpretations, see [19, Section 4]. 
An immediate generalization of the FGH Theorem is due essentially to Franco Montagna.
Theorem 3.3. Consider any numerized theory T = 〈T,N 〉. Let ✷ := ✷T . Let S(x) be
Σ 01 and let R be such that Q  R ↔ S(#R) ≤ ✷R. We have:
EA  (S(#R) ∨✷⊥) ↔ (R ∨ ✷⊥)
↔ ✷R
or, equivalently, EA + con(T )  (S(#R)↔ R) ∧ (S(#R)↔ ✷R).
It is easy to see that Rosser’s Theorem is an immediate consequence of Montagna’s
Theorem. We end this subsection, by proving a variant of a part of the FGH Theorem
that will be used in Section 4.
Theorem 3.4. Consider any numerized theory T . Let ✷ := ✷T . Let A be ∃∀∆0 and
let R be such that Q  R ↔ A ≤ ✷R. Let BΣ 01 be the Σ 01 -collection principle: ∀x≤a ∃y S0(y)→ ∃b ∀x≤a ∃y≤b S0(y), where S0 ∈ ∆0. We have:
EA+ BΣ1  ✷R → (A ∨✷⊥),
or, equivalently, EA + BΣ1 + con(T )  ✷R → A.
Proof. Reason in EA + BΣ1. Suppose ✷R. We have A ≤ ✷R or ✷R < A. In the
first case, we may conclude A, and we are done. Suppose ✷R < A. This has the form
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∃p (proof(p, #R) ∧ ∀y≤p ∃z ¬ A0(y, z)), where A0 is in ∆0. By Σ 01 -collection, our
formula is equivalent to:
C := ∃p ∃x (proof(p, #R) ∧ ∀y≤p ∃z ≤ x ¬ A0(y, z)).
Thus, we find: ✷C , and, hence, ✷(R < A). I.o.w., ✷R⊥. Combining this with our
assumption ✷R, we find ✷⊥ and we are done. 
3.2. The FGH Theorem and S12
It is an open problem whether the FGH Theorem can be formalized in S12, even for
S ∈ ∃Σ b1 . However, for a restricted range of theories, we can prove a salient consequence
of FGH Theorem.
Theorem 3.5. Let T = 〈T,N 〉 be a sequential numerized theory. Suppose that T is either
finitely axiomatized or an extension by finitely many axioms of I∆0+Ω1 (relativized toN ).
We write ✷ := ✷T . Let A be any T -sentence. Let R be such that Q  R ↔ ✷A ≤ ✷R.
We have: S12  ✷A ↔ ✷R.
Proof. Reason in S12.
Suppose ✷A. By the small reflection principle (Fact 2.8), we have (a):
✷((✷R < ✷A)→ R).
By ✷A and Fact 2.7, we have (b) ✷(✷A ≤ ✷R ∨ ✷R < ✷A). Combining (a) and (b), we
find ✷R.
Conversely, suppose ✷R. By the small reflection principle Fact 2.8, we have:
✷((✷A ≤ ✷R) → A),
i.e. ✷(R → A). Ergo,✷A. 
3.3. Some consequences of the FGH Theorem
The proof of Theorem 4.1 is our central application of the FGH Theorem in this paper.
We also use it in the proof of Theorem C.7. In this subsection we spell out some more
immediate consequences of Theorem 3.1. These consequences are not strictly needed for
the rest of the paper. They have, however, heuristic value. Moreover, they are interesting in
their own right. For some further information, the reader is referred to [13, Chapter 7].
3.3.1. 1-Reducibility
We give a quick proof of a well-known fact.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose T can be extended to a consistent numerizable theory W. Then,
any RE set is 1-reducible to T . A fortiori, T is of Turing degree 0′.
Proof. Clearly, we may assume that W is a finite extension of T , say W = T + A. Let
W = 〈W,N 〉 be a numerization of W . Consider any RE set X with index e. Let Rn be the
FGH sentence for the theoryW corresponding to the sentence Sn := ({e}n  0). Clearly,
the mapping n → (A → RNn ) is recursive. By the FGH Theorem, formulated externally,
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we have:
n ∈ X ⇔ T  A → RNn . 
3.3.2. Closure under disjunction
We show that provabilities are closed under disjunction.
Theorem 3.7. Let T be a numerized theory. Let ✷ := ✷T . For any sentences A and B of
the language of T , there is a Σ1-sentence C such that EA  ✷C ↔ (✷A ∨✷B).
Proof. Take S := (✷A ∨✷B) in Theorem 3.1. 
Note that C can in fact be taken to be ∃Π b1 .
3.3.3. Degrees of provably deductive consequence
Let T be numerized. Let A and B be sentences of the language of T . Let ✷ := ✷T . We
define:
• A T B :⇔ T  ✷A → ✷B .
• A ≡T B :⇔ A T B and B T A.
We call T provably deductive consequence and we call ≡T provably deductive
equivalence. Clearly, these notions yield a degree structure on the sentences of T .
Theorem 3.8. Let T = 〈T,N 〉 be a numerized theory. Suppose T proves EA (relativized
toN ). Then, each degree of provably deductive equivalence of T contains a ∃Π b1 -sentence.
Proof. Let γ be such a degree. Suppose C ∈ γ . Take S := ✷C in Theorem 3.1. 
We can extend Theorem 3.8 to certain weaker theories by using Theorem 3.5.
Theorem 3.9. Let T = 〈T,N 〉 be a sequential numerized theory. Suppose that T is either
finitely axiomatized or an extension by finitely many axioms of I∆0 + Ω1 (relativized to
N ). Suppose that T proves S12 (relativized toN ). Then, each degree of provably deductive
equivalence of T contains a ∃Π b1 -sentence.
3.3.4. Smoryn´ski’s Theorem
The following application is due to Smoryn´ski. See [11, p. 366] or [13, p. 312].
Theorem 3.10 (Smoryn´ski’s Theorem). Let T = 〈T,N 〉 be numerized theory. Suppose
T  EA. Then, we have, verifiably in EA, that T is Σ 01 -sound iff T is consistent and
T + con(T ) is Σ 01 -conservative over T .
Proof. We write ✷ := ✷T . Reason in EA.
Suppose T is Σ 01 -sound. Let S be in Σ 01 . Suppose ✷(con(T ) → S). Then, we find
✷(S∨✷⊥). By Σ 01 -soundness, it follows that (S∨✷⊥). Hence, byΣ 01 -completeness,✷S.
Suppose that T is consistent and T + con(T ) is Σ 01 -conservative over T . Suppose✷S.
Applying the first equivalence of the FGH Theorem inside the ✷, we obtain ✷(R ∨ ✷⊥).
Ergo,✷(con(T )→ R). By Σ 01 -conservativity, it follows that ✷R. We may conclude, now
applying the FGH Theorem outside the ✷, that S. 
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Note that the assumption that T  EA, was only used in the second part of the proof in the
‘internal’ application of the FGH Theorem. We can extend the result to theories T such
that every T -cut I has a subcut J with J : T ✄ T . Examples of such theories are S12,
I∆0 + Ω14 + con(F), I∆0 + {Ωn+1 | n ∈ ω} and PA + incon(PA).
Theorem 3.11. Let T = 〈T,N 〉 be numerized theory. Suppose that every T -cut I has a
subcut J with J : T ✄ T . Then, we have, verifiably in EA, that T is Σ 01 -sound iff T is
consistent and T + con(T ) is Σ 01 -conservative over T .
Proof. We replace the second part of the previous proof by the following variation.
Suppose that T is consistent and that T + con(T ) is Σ 01 -conservative over T . Suppose
✷S. Using Fact 2.2(2), (1), we can find a T -cut J such that (a) J : T ✄ (I∆0 + T ) and (b)
✷(∀x∈J ∃y 2x = y). By (a), we find✷S J . Ergo✷(R∨R⊥)J , Hence,✷(R∨(R⊥)J ). Also
(c) ✷((R⊥)J → ✷R). Since, in the proof of Σ 01 -completeness for T , the transformation
of the witness x of a Σ 01 -sentence S
′ to a proof p of S′ is of order 2xm , for standard m, we
get by (b): ✷((R⊥)J → ✷R⊥). Ergo (d) ✷((R⊥)J → ✷⊥). We may conclude from (c)
and (d): ✷(R ∨ ✷⊥).
Hence, ✷(con(T )→ R). By Σ 01 -conservativity, it follows that ✷R. We may conclude,
by the FGH Theorem, that S. 
Here is a corollary from Theorem 3.10. Suppose T = 〈T,N 〉  EA. We say that
T = 〈T,N 〉 is reflexive if it proves for every n the statement con(Tn). Here Tn is the
theory axiomatized by EAN plus the T -axioms with Go¨delnumber less than or equal to n.
Corollary 3.12. Suppose T is a consistent, numerized, reflexive theory such that T  EA.
Suppose there is an n, such that, for allΣ 01 -sentences S, whenever T  S, we have Tn  S.
Then T is Σ 01 -sound.
Proof. Let ✷ := ✷T and ✷n := ✷Tn . Suppose ✷n(con(Tn) → S), then, by reflexivity,
✷S. Hence, ✷n S. Applying Theorem 3.10 to Tn , we find S. So Tn is Σ 01 -sound. Hence, T
is also Σ 01 -sound. 
The above theorem tells us that, if a theory that is consistent, numerized, reflexive and
verifies EA, proves a false Σ 01 -sentence, then it is forced to tell more and more complex
lies, i.e. it will prove false Σ 01 -sentences the proofs of which need more and more axioms.
4. Σ01 -soundness in potentia
In this section, we prove a theorem that will be the main lemma to our proof that
consistent, finitely axiomatized, sequential theories are trustworthy. Let EA+ be I∆0 +
supexp, where supexp is the axiom stating that the superexponentiation function is total.
Theorem 4.1. Let T := 〈T,N 〉 be a finitely axiomatized, sequential theory. We write
✷ := ✷T . There is a T -cut I such that, for allΣ 01 -sentences S, EA+  (S∨✷⊥)↔ ✷SI ,
or equivalently, EA+ + con(T )  S ↔ ✷SI .
Before proving our theorem we formulate and prove an immediate corollary.
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Corollary 4.2. Let T := 〈T,N 〉 be a finitely axiomatized, sequential theory. There is a
T -cut I such that 〈T, I 〉 is (EA+ + con(T ))-verifiably Σ 01 -sound.
Proof. Let I be the cut promised in Theorem 4.1. We have, for any Σ 01 -sentence S,
EA+ + con(T )  ✷T SI → S, and hence, EA+ + con(T )  ✷〈T ,I 〉S → S. 
To get the proof of Theorem 4.1 going, we need a few preparatory steps. We will apply
the FGH Theorem to a restricted proof predicate, where the formulas in the proof are
restricted to formulas of a certain complexity. We take as measure of complexity ρ, where
ρ(A) is the depth of quantifier changes. This measure is discussed in some detail in [19].
We take Γn to be the set of formulas of complexity at most n and Γ cln the set of sentences
of Γn . m-provability will be provability from axioms with Go¨delnumber below m, where
the formulas occurring in the proof are all in Γm .
The notation A(k) is somewhat misleading. In general we are working in some
interpretation of number theory. So the term k occurs in unwound relational form. Our
measure ρ is designed to be insensitive to such fine points.
Lemma 4.3. ρ(A(k)) is independent of k.
Proof. Suppose, for simplicity, that we are working with tally-numerals. A(k) in T could
look like this:
∃x0 . . . ∃xk (0N (x0) ∧ SN (x0, x1) ∧ . . . ∧ SN (xk−1, xk) ∧ A(xk)).
The complexity of this formula is max(ρ(0N (x)), ρ(SN (x, y)), ρ(A(x))) + 1. This
formula is clearly estimated by ρ(A(x)) + c, for a fixed standard c. Similar reasoning
works for efficient numerals based e.g. on binary notations. 
Here is a fundamental lemma about ✷n .
Lemma 4.4. Suppose that T := 〈T,N 〉 is a finitely axiomatized theory. Let ✷ and ✷m be
the provability and the m-provability predicates of T . We have, for any T -sentence A and
k > ρ(A) and k larger than the complexities of the axioms of T , EA+  ✷k A ↔ ✷A.
Proof. The left-to-right direction is obvious. To prove the right-to-left direction, reason
in EA+. Suppose ✷A. We can, using supexp, find a cutfree proof in predicate logic of
C → A, where C is the conjunction of the T -axioms. See [4, Part V, Chapter 5], for
details. By the subformula property, this proof is also a k-proof. 
Note that we used the fact that T is finitely axiomatized in an essential way in the proof.
Remark 4.5. It has been shown by Philipp Gerhardy that it is possible to replace, in
the usual superexponential estimate of the growth involved in cut elimination, the usual
measure of complexity (depth of connectives) by a measure that is a minor modification of
our measure ρ of depth of quantifier changes. See [2]. For Gerhardy’s more recent results,
see: 〈http://www.daimi.au.dk/∼peegee〉. 
Lemma 4.6. Let T := 〈T,N 〉 be finitely axiomatized. Let ✷ and ✷m be the provability
and the m-provability predicates of T . Consider aΣ 01 -sentence S. We can find Rm such that
Q  Rm ↔ S ≤ ✷m Rm, by the Go¨del Fixed Point Lemma. Note that ρ(Rm) := ρ(S)+ c,
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for a standard c which is independent of m. Choose n > ρ(S) + c. We have: EA+ 
(S ∨✷⊥)↔ ✷Rn.
Proof. We want to apply the FGH Theorem. To do this we must verify that the steps
in the proof go through for our n-provability. Note e.g. that n is large enough to have:
EA  Rn → ✷n Rn and EA  R⊥n → ✷n R⊥n . Thus, we have: EA  (S ∨ ✷n⊥)↔ ✷n Rn .
Now apply Lemma 4.4. 
Our proof strategy will be to provide a cut I , such that, EA+-verifiably, we have ✷Rn ↔
✷SI . Then we may apply Lemma 4.6. To get the desired result, we need a reflection
principle.
Lemma 4.7. Let U := 〈U,M〉 be any sequential theory. Let ✷ be U-provability and let
✷n be U-n-provability. For any n, we can find a U-cut J such that EA  ∀A∈Γ cln ✷(✷Jn
A → A).
Proof. This is Fact 2.4.5(ii) of [19]. The idea is that, in U , we can define a satisfaction
predicate for Γn and prove Γn-reflection by replacing induction over proof length by the
use of a definable cut. 
The next lemma is nearly the theorem we are aiming to prove. The only defect is that I is
still dependent on ρ(S).
Lemma 4.8. Let T := 〈T,N 〉 be a finitely axiomatized, sequential theory. We write
✷ := ✷T . For any Σ 01 -sentence S, there is a T -cut I such that, EA+  (S∨✷⊥)↔ ✷SI ,
or equivalently, EA+ + con(T )  S ↔ ✷SI . The cut I depends only on ρ(S).
Proof. Take n and Rn as in Lemma 4.6. Let R := Rn . We have, by Lemma 4.6, (a)
EA+  (S ∨ ✷⊥) ↔ ✷R. Choose a reflecting T -cut I for ✷n as in Lemma 4.7. By
Fact 2.2(2), we can choose I in such a way that it verifies ∆0-induction. Note that I will
only depend on ρ(S).
The left-to-right direction is immediate by the obis-principle. We treat the other
direction. By (a), it is sufficient to show that EA+  ✷SI → ✷R.
Reason in EA+. Suppose ✷SI . Since we have ∆0-induction in I , it follows that
✷(S ≤ ✷n R ∨ ✷n R < S)I and so ✷((S ≤ ✷n R)I ∨ (✷n R < S)I ). The first disjunct is
equivalent to RI , which implies R. To the second disjunct we apply the reflection principle
from Lemma 4.7 to infer R. Thus, we obtain ✷R. 
We want to make the cut I independent of the Σ 01 -sentence S. The problem is that Σ
0
1 -
sentences may have arbitrarily large ρ-complexities. If we would have N : T ✄ EA,
there would be no problem, since we have EA  S ↔ trueΣ (#S), where trueΣ is the
ordinary Σ 01 -truth predicate, which is itself given by a Σ
0
1 -formula. All sentences of the
form trueΣ (#S) have some complexity below a fixed finite n. We can use the idea even in
the absence of EA by making our cut smaller. Here is another lemma.
Lemma 4.9. Let S = ∃x S0(x), where S0 ∈ ∆0. Let the truth predicate be of the form
∃y trueΣ ,0(y, z), where (trueΣ ,0(y, z)) ∈ ∆0. There is a fixed standard k, such that
S12  (S0(x) ∧ 2x
k ↓)→ ∃y≤2xk trueΣ ,0(y, #S).
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Proof. The proof is by inspecting the usual EA-proof of S → trueΣ (#S). See e.g. [4,
Part C, Chapter 5(b)], for a detailed presentation. 
Here is the proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof. Let J be the cut provided by Lemma 4.8 for the complexity of theΣ -truthpredicate.
Let I be a shorter cut, such that T  ∀x∈I 2x ∈ J .
Let a Σ 01 -sentence S be given. The left-to-right direction is immediate, using the obis-
principle. We treat the direction from right-to-left. Take S∗ := trueΣ (S). By Lemma 4.8,
we get EA+  (S∗ ∨ ✷⊥) ↔ ✷S J∗ . By Lemma 4.9, we find T  SI → S J∗ . Thus, we
have:
EA+  ✷SI → ✷S J∗
→ S∗ ∨ ✷⊥
→ S ∨ ✷⊥.
So we are done. 
Open Question 4.10. Can one find a numerized, non-sequential, finitely axiomatized
theory for which there is a false Σ 01 -sentence which is provable on every definable cut?
We draw an obvious corollary.
Corollary 4.11. Suppose T is consistent, finitely axiomatized and sequential. Then there
are a T -cut I and a modelM of T such that, inM, witnesses of Σ 01 -sentences are either
in the initial segment of the T -numbers isomorphic to ω or not in I .
Proof. Choose I as in Theorem 4.1. Clearly, U := T +{¬SI | N #|= S} is consistent. Take
M a model of U . 
Note that Corollary 4.11, in its turn, directly implies Theorem 4.1. Another immediate
corollary is as follows. This corollary is about the limes inferior of a sequential theory T .
The notion of limes inferior of a sequential theory T or li(T ) was introduced in Remark 2.3.
Corollary 4.12. Let T be a consistent, sequential, finitely axiomatized theory. Then li(T )
is Σ 01 -sound.
We can extend Lemma 4.8 partly to a wider formula class.
Definition 4.13. Consider any numerized theory T . Let B := ∃x B0(x) be a formula
of the language of T . Let I be a T -cut. We write B[I ] for ∃x∈I B0(x) (or: B < ∃x
x #∈ I ). 
Theorem 4.14. Let T := 〈T,N 〉 be a finitely axiomatized, sequential theory. We write
✷ := ✷T . For any ∃∀∆0-sentence A, there is a T -cut I such that, EA++BΣ1  ✷A[I ] →
(A ∨✷⊥), or equivalently,
EA+ + BΣ1 + con(T )  ✷A[I ] → A.
The cut I depends only on ρ(A).
118 A. Visser / Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 131 (2005) 103–131
Proof. Take R as in Theorem 3.4, with ✷n , for a suitably large n, substituted for ✷. We
find, using cut elimination, from Theorem 3.4:
EA+ + BΣ1  ✷R → (A ∨ ✷⊥).
Let I be an n-reflecting T -cut satisfying I∆0. It is sufficient to show in EA+ + BΣ1 that
✷A[I ] implies ✷R.
Reason in EA+ + BΣ1. Suppose ✷A[I ]. Since
✷(✷n R → ✷n R ≤ ✷n R)I ,
it follows, by Fact 2.5(7), that✷(A[I ] ≤ ✷In R∨✷In R < A[I ]).9 Clearly, the first disjunct is
T -equivalent to R[I ], and, thus, implies in T that R. Moreover, the second disjunct implies
in T that ✷In R. Hence, since I is n-reflecting, the second disjunct implies R in T . Thus,
we find (outside of T ): ✷R. 
We can extend Theorem 4.1 to a larger class of theories.
Theorem 4.15. Let T be a consistent, sequential, finitely axiomatized theory. Suppose that
T and U are mutually interpretable. Then there is a Σ 01 -sound numerization U = 〈U,P〉
of U.
Note that U need not be sequential! Before proving the theorem we need a lemma, which
is a strengthening of Lo¨b’s Theorem.
Lemma 4.16. Let T = 〈T,N 〉 be a numerized, consistent, sequential, finitely axiomatized
theory. Let I be a T -cut and let A be a sentence of the language of T . Then there is a k
such that
I∆0 + Ω1  ✷T (✷IT ,k A → A)→ ✷T A.
The number k depends only on the complexities of the axioms of T , the complexity of N ,
the complexity of I and the complexity of A. Our complexity measure here is ρ, i.e. depth
of quantifier changes.
The lemma is a special case of Theorem 4.2 of [19]. We turn to the proof of Theorem 4.15.
Proof. Suppose K : T ✄U and M : U ✄ T . Note that N ′ := NM K is an interpretation
of F in T . (We write composition in the order of application here.) By Fact 2.2(3), there is
a T -cut J that is T -provably isomorphic with a T -cut J ′ of N ′. By Fact 2.2(2), we may
assume that J satisfies I∆0 + Ω1. Let K be the ρ-complexity of the Σ 01 -truth predicate.
By the external form of Lemma 4.16, we can find a k such that, for any A ∈ ΓK+n , if
T  ✷JT ,k A → A, then T  A. Here n is a sufficiently large number.
By Lemma 4.7, we can find a T -cut I ∗ such that T  ✷I ∗T ,k B → B , for any B ∈ Γk .
Let I be a subcut of I ∗ such that T  ∀x∈I 2x ∈ I ∗. By Fact 2.2(2), we may choose I ∗
and I such that they satisfy I∆0+Ω1. Consider any Σ 01 -sentence S. Let S0 := trueΣ (#S).
We have, by Lemma 4.9, T  SI → SI ∗0 .
9 Note that, to apply the verbatim statement of Fact 2.5(7) we have to shift to the theory 〈T, I 〉 first and, then,
shift back to T . Alternatively, we can just run through the proof again for the modified statement.
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Let R be such that F  R ↔ S0 ≤ ✷T ,k R. We have:
T  SI → SI ∗0
→ (R ∨ (✷T ,k R < S0))I ∗
→ R ∨✷I ∗T ,k R
→ R.
We take P := IM. Suppose, for any Σ 01 -sentence S, that U  S. This tells us that
M : U ✄ (T + SI ). Ergo M : U ✄ (T + RN ). We may conclude that T  RNM K ,
i.o.w. T  RN ′ . It now follows that
T  ✷JT ,k R → RN
′ ∧ ✷J ′T ,k R
→ R J ′
→ R J
→ R.
Applying Lo¨b’s rule, we have T  R. By cutelimination, we find T k R. Hence, by the
external version of the proof of the FGH Theorem, we find that S0 is true and, thus, that S
is true. 
5. On the manufacture of faith
We repeat the definition of trustworthiness here.
Definition 5.1. A theory V is trustworthy if every U interpretable in V is also faithfully
interpretable in V . 
In this section, we will provide a characterization of trustworthy theories. Friedman’s
result that consistent, finitely axiomatized, sequential theories are trustworthy, will follow
from this characterization in combination with Theorem 4.1. Our treatment in this section
can be viewed as generalizing some of Per Lindstro¨m’s work on faithful interpretability.
See [7, Chapter 6, Section 2]. The methods used are for a great part those developed by Per
Lindstro¨m and Viteslav ˇSvejdar.
5.1. An upper bound
In this subsection we prove an upper bound result. We need two lemmas.
Lemma 5.2. Let T = 〈T,N 〉 be a numerized theory. Let Γ be any class of T -sentences
for which T contains a definable truth predicate, say TRUE. We only need that TRUE
satisfies Tarski’s convention. Suppose that the set of codes of elements of Γ has a fixed
binumeration in T . Then, there is a unary predicate of numbers A(x), such that T 
(A(x) ∧ A(y)) → x = y, and such that, for any n, T + A(n) is Γ -conservative over T .
We may consider A as representing a closed partial numerical term τ , writing ‘τ  x’ for
‘A(x)’.
We give the proof in Appendix B.
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Lemma 5.3. Let T = 〈T,N 〉 be a numerized theory. Let L be a language of finite
signature σ for predicate logic. We call predicate logic of signature σ : FOLσ . Let α(x)
be any formula in the language of T such that T proves that all elements of {x | α(x)} are
codes ofL-sentences. We write✷α for provability from the sentences coded by the elements
of {x | α(x)}. We write con(α) for ¬✷α⊥.
There is an interpretationH : (T + con(α))✄ FOLσ such that, for any L-sentence A,
we have T + con(α)+✷α A  AH. We say thatH is a Henkin interpretation of α.
Proof. We can see this by inspection of the usual proof of the Interpretation Existence
Lemma. The basic idea is that we formalize the Henkin construction, employing definable
cuts whenever we would have used induction in PA. See e.g. [17] or [18]. 
We proceed with our, somewhat technical, upperbound result. The bit with the sentence A
is present, because we want our result to be applicable also to some theories that are not
numerizable.
Lemma 5.4. Let T be any theory. SupposeK : T ✄U. Let A be any T -sentence. Suppose
W = 〈T + A,N 〉 is numerized. Then there is an interpretationM : T ✄U such that, for
any U-sentence B, T  BM ⇒W  ✷U B.
Proof. ConsiderW . We can, by Fact 2.2(1) and Lemma 4.9, shorten N to a W-definable
cut J such that Z := 〈T + A, J 〉 contains a truth predicate for the Σ 01 -sentences
of Z . (Remember that the meaning of ‘Σ 01 ’ shifts with the numerization.) Note thatZ  ✷U B ⇒W  ✷U B . It follows that it is sufficient to prove our theorem for Z . Thus,
we may, without loss of generality, assume thatW contains a truth predicate, say true, for
the Σ 01 -sentences. Moreover, we may, by Fact 2.2(2), assume thatW proves I∆0 + Ω1.
Let τ be the partial closed term promised by Lemma 5.2 for W and Σ 01 . We fix some
standard enumeration Cx of the U -sentences in such a way that W verifies its elementary
properties. We specify M, in T , by cases. In case we have ¬A, we take M equal to K.
Suppose we have A. We may now work in W . Let U∗ := U + {Cx | τ  x}. Note that
(i) U∗ is not ∆b1-axiomatized, and that (ii) in talking about U∗ we are really talking about
the formula defining the axiom set and that (iii) the definition of U∗ only makes sense in
the presence of A. In case incon(U∗), we take M again equal to K. If con(U∗), we take
M equal to the Henkin-interpretationH of U∗. We give the clauses for M, for the cases
of the domain of the interpretation and the translation of a binary predicate:
• δM(x) :↔ ((¬A ∨ (A ∧ inconN (U∗))) ∧ δK(x)) ∨ (A ∧ conN (U∗) ∧ δH(x)),
• PM(x, y) :↔ ((¬A ∨ (A ∧ inconN (U∗))) ∧ PK(x, y)) ∨
(A ∧ conN (U∗) ∧ PH(x, y)).
(In writing e.g. ‘inconN (U∗)’, we intend no relativization of the formula defining the
axiom set.)
Clearly,M : T ✄U . Suppose T  BM. Let ¬ B = Cn . We have:
W + τ  n  “(U +¬B) = U∗”.
Hence, W + (τ = n) + con(U + ¬ B)  ¬ BM. Thus, W  (τ  n) → ✷U B . By the
Σ 01 -conservativity of τ  n, we findW  ✷U B . 
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5.2. The characterization
In this subsection, we provide the promised characterization of trustworthiness and
prove Friedman’s result as a corollary.
Theorem 5.5. Let T be any ∆b1-axiomatized theory. The following are equivalent.
(1) T is trustworthy.
(2) T has a (finite) extension which has a Σ 01 -sound numerization.
(3) T has a (finite) extension on which there is Σ 01 -sound interpretation of Q.
(4) There is a faithful interpretation of predicate logic with one binary relation symbol
into T .10
Proof. “(1) ⇒ (2)”. Suppose T is trustworthy. Say the (relational) signature of number
theory is σ . Trivially, the predicate logic FOLσ is interpretable in T . Hence, there is a
faithful interpretation, say K, of FOLσ in T . It is easily seen that 〈T + (∧F)K,K〉 is a
Σ 01 -sound numerization of an extension of T .
“(2) ⇒ (1)”. Suppose T has a (finite) extension which has a Σ 01 -sound numerization,
sayW . It follows, by Σ 01 -soundness, thatW  ✷U B implies U  B .
Suppose K : T ✄ U . By Lemma 5.4, we may conclude that there is a faithful
interpretationM : T ✄U .
“(1)⇒ (4)”. This is immediate.
“(4) ⇒ (2)”. Suppose P is a faithful interpretation of predicate logic with one binary
relation symbol into T . There is a finitely axiomatized set theory, say S, in the language
with just one binary relation symbol into which F is faithfully interpretable, say viaQ. See
e.g. [9]. Hence, 〈T + (∧S)P ,QP〉 is a Σ 01 -sound numerization of an extension of T .
“(3) ⇔ (2)”. This is immediate, by the fact that F can be interpreted in Q on a cut I .
Cuts are downwards closed under ≤. So we can always convert a Σ 01 sound interpretation
of Q into a Σ 01 -sound interpretation of F. 
The definition of trustworthiness is ‘neutral’ w.r.t. arithmetical theories and the like,
in that it does not mention the presence of any device allowing coding. It does not
even mention specific signatures. Thus it is remarkable that a theory involving coding
is connected via (2) of the theorem to trustworthiness. In Appendix C, we will discuss
a nice alternative formulation of (2) of the theorem. From Theorem 5.5 combined with
Theorem 4.1, we may now immediately conclude to Friedman’s Theorem.
Corollary 5.6 (Friedman’s Theorem). Finitely axiomatized, sequential, consistent theo-
ries are trustworthy.
Remark 5.7. We have proved Friedman’s Theorem from Theorem 4.1. It is easily seen
that, conversely, the existence of a Σ 01 -sound cut again follows from Corollary 5.6.
Consider a finitely axiomatized, numerized, sequential and consistent theory T = 〈T,N 〉.
By Friedman’s Theorem, there is a faithful interpretationM of F in T . Clearly, 〈T,M〉 is
10 We might want to insist that predicate logic contains identity. In this case it is only necessary that the
interpretation is faithful w.r.t. the fragment of the formulas containing only R.
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Σ 01 -sound. Ergo, by Fact 2.2(3) and the upwards persistence of Σ 01 -sentences, we can find
a T -cut I such that 〈T, I 〉 is Σ 01 -sound. 
Example 5.8. PA + incon(PA) is not trustworthy. This can be seen e.g. by noting that
PA + incon(PA) ✄ PA. Since any interpretation of PA in PA + incon(PA) is verifiably
an end-extension of the identity interpretation, it will, by the upwards persistence of Σ 01 -
sentences, satisfy incon(PA). Hence no faithful interpretation of PA in PA+ incon(PA) is
possible.
In contrast, ACA0 + incon(ACA0) is trustworthy. 
We may use Theorem 4.15 to get a strengthening of Friedman’s Theorem.
Corollary 5.9. Suppose T is consistent, finitely axiomatized and sequential. Suppose T
and U are mutually interpretable. Then U is trustworthy.
Open Question 5.10. We could say that a theory T is solid if every U that is mutually
interpretable with T is trustworthy. Is there a perspicuous characterization of solid
theories?
Note that PA and PA + incon(PA) are mutually interpretable. So, by Example 5.8, PA
is trustworthy but not solid. 
We proceed with some further corollaries of Theorem 5.5. The following corollary is easy.
Corollary 5.11. Any subtheory of a trustworthy theory is trustworthy.
Corollary 5.12. Consider Group Theory groupc, where we allow an extra constant c in
the language. The theory groupc is trustworthy.
Proof. Tarski constructs, in [15], a model G of groupc that has as definable inner model
the natural numbers with plus and times. In other words, he constructs an interpretationK
with K : Th(G) ✄ Th(N). It follows that 〈groupc + (
∧
F)K,K〉 is Σ 01 -sound. Ergo, by
Theorem 5.5, groupc is trustworthy. 
Corollary 5.13. Any trustworthy theory is of degree 0′.
Proof. This is immediate by Theorem 3.6. 
Open Question 5.14. What is the complexity of trustworthiness? Our characterization
shows that this complexity is at most Σ 03 . I conjecture that it is complete Σ 03 . 
6. On the nature of trustworthiness
The notion of trustworthiness may, at first sight, seem to be somewhat artificial. Thus,
one may wonder what structure is ‘the natural home’ of the notion. I am not sure this
question has a unique answer. However, the answer given below is a good candidate. The
answer will be that the relevant ‘structure’ is the embedding functor of two preorders.
Consider the preorder PFI of consistent theories ordered by the relation ✁f, where
U ✁f V if U is faithfully interpretable in V . We write U ≡f V for: U ✁f V and V ✁f U .
Consider also the preorder PI of consistent theories ordered by the relation✁, where U✁V
if U is interpretable in V . We write U ≡ V for: U ✁ V and V ✁U .
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These preorders can be viewed as categories in the usual way. If we divide out
isomorphisms, we get the partial orderings of degrees of faithful interpretability and of
degrees of interpretability.
Let emb be the identical embedding functor from PFI to PI. We will show that emb
has a right adjoint, (˜·), i.e. a mapping from theories to theories satisfying the magical
equation:11
U ✁f V˜ ⇔ emb(U)✁ V .
From this equation, the following facts are immediate consequences.
(1) (˜·) is a functor.
(2) The theory V˜ is trustworthy.
(3) V ≡ V˜ . So, every degree of interpretability has a trustworthy element.
(4) V is trustworthy iff V ≡f V˜ .
We specify (˜·). Consider a theory T . We expand the signature of T with a unary predicate
P and with a binary predicate R. The theory T˜ is the theory axiomatized by the axioms
of T where we relativize the quantifiers to P . No non-logical principles concerning R
are added. (The logical axioms concerning identity belong to predicate logic and are left
unrelativized.) It is easily seen that (a) T ≡ T˜ . By a simple model-theoretical argument, we
may show that T˜ is conservative over predicate logic with just the binary relation symbol R.
Hence, by translating R as R(x, y), the theory T˜ faithfully interprets predicate logic with
just the binary relation symbol R. By Theorem 5.5(4), it follows that (b) T˜ is trustworthy.
From (a) and (b), it is immediate that (˜·) is right adjoint to emb.
In case T has an infinite model, we can skip the relativization to P in the construction
of T˜ . Thus we only need to expand the signature with R. Note that sequential theories
are not closed under relativization of the domain. However, sequential theories are closed
under adding predicate symbols. By the preceding observation, the mapping add a binary
relation symbol will be right adjoint of the embedding functor, if we restrict both preorders
to consistent sequential theories.
In case a numerization 〈T,N 〉 satisfies full induction, we can also take for T˜ , the theory
PA + {conn(T ) | n ∈ ω}, where conn(T ) means consistency of the set of axioms of
T with Go¨del number less than or equal to n. It follows that we can find an appropriate
right adjoint, if we restrict both preorders to consistent extensions of PA in the arithmetical
language.
By Theorem 5.9, consistent, finitely axiomatized, sequential theories T have the further
property that if T ≡ U , then T ≡f U . It is easy to see that this property is equivalent to the
property of solidity introduced in Question 5.10.
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Appendix A. A notational convention
In this appendix we make the convention for the use of two kinds of variables and
of boxes precise. Let T = 〈T,N 〉, T ′ = 〈T ′,N 〉, . . ., be numerized theories and let
U,U ′, . . ., be arbitrary theories. We assume that each theory comes equipped with a ∆b1-
formula defining the axiom set. We treat the case, where we just have ordinary boxes in the
language. Addition of e.g. ✷T ,n and ✷U,n is entirely analogous.
We assume the language LT of T has variables ξ, ξ ′, . . .. We enrich LT to a language
LT with a second kind of variables x, x ′, . . . and with unary operators ✷U and ✷T ′ , for
various U and T ′. The terms of the extended language are the smallest set containing both
sets of variables and closed under the term-forming operations of LT . The set of formulas
of LT is the smallest set F such that:
• P(t0, . . . , tn−1) is in F , if the ti are terms of the extended language and P is an n-ary
predicate symbol of LT ;
• F is closed under the propositional connectives and under the quantifiers ∀x , ∃x , ∀ξ ,
∃ξ , for all variables x and ξ ;
• If A is a sentence of LU , then ✷U A is in F ;
• If A is a formula of LT ′ with only free variables in x, x ′, y, . . ., then ✷T ′ A is in F .
We can give the formulas of LT their desired translations into LT via the translation
(·)T . We arrange it so that we have infinitely many variables η, η′, . . . available in LT
distinct from the variables ξ, ξ ′, . . .. We translate the terms by replacing x by η, x ′ by η′,
etc.
• (P(t0, . . . , tn−1))T := P(tT0 , . . . , tTn−1);
• (·)T commutes with the propositional connectives and with ∀ξ , ∃ξ ;
• (∀x A)T := ∀η (δN (η)→ AT );
• (∃x A)T := ∃η (δN (η) ∧ AT );
• (✷U A)T := provU (#A);
• (✷T ′ A)T := provT ′(#(AT ′)).
(The numerical variables in A are treated in the usual way.)
Appendix B. Conservativity
In this appendix, we prove Lemma 5.2. Let T = 〈T,N 〉 be a numerized theory. Let Γ
be any class of T -sentences for which T contains a definable truth predicate, say TRUE.
We only need that TRUE satisfies Tarski’s convention. We assume that the set of codes of
elements of Γ has a fixed binumeration in T . We show that there is a unary predicate of
numbers A(x), such that T  (A(x) ∧ A(y))→ x = y, such that, for any n, T + A(n) is
Γ -conservative over T .
We define, in T , using the Go¨del Fixed Point Lemma, the formula A(x) as follows.
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A(x) ↔ ∃p ∃C∈Γ ( proofT (p, A(x)→ C) ∧ ¬TRUE(C) ∧
∀q < p ∀D∈Γ ∀y ( proofT (q, A(y)→ D) → TRUE(D) ) ).
We assume that the formalization of proof is standard, so that every proof has a single
conclusion C with C < p, etc. We first prove the uniqueness clause. Reason in T . Suppose
that x #= y and A(x) and A(y). Let p be a witness for A(x) and let q be a witness of A(y).
By our assumption about the proof predicate, it follows that p #= q . Since in F, we have
the linearity of <, it follows that p < q or q < p. By the specification of A, it follows that
this is impossible.
We move to the metatheory again. We prove our theorem by induction on T -proofs.
Suppose, that for all T -proofs q < p, we have, if q : T  A(m) → D, for some m and
for some D ∈ Γ , then T  D. (‘r : T  E’ means: r is a T -proof of E .) Suppose further
that p : T  A(n)→ C , for C ∈ Γ . We show T  C . From our assumptions, we have the
following propositions.
T  (C ∈ Γ ) (B.1)
p : T  A(n)→ C. (B.2)
It follows that:
T +¬C  ¬A(n) (B.3)
T +¬C  C ∈ Γ ∧ proofT (p, A(n)→ C) ∧ ¬TRUE(C). (B.4)
Using (B.3) and (B.4) and the specification of A, we may conclude that:
T +¬C  ∃q < p ∃D∈Γ ∃y ( proofT (q, A(y)→ D) ∧ ¬TRUE(D) ). (B.5)
It follows that:
T +¬C 
∨
q<p,D<p,D∈Γ ,m<p
( proofT (q, A(m)→ D) ∧ ¬ D ). (B.6)
Consider any q < p, D < p with D ∈ Γ , and m < p. In case we have: q : T  A(m) →
D, it follows, by the minimality of p, that T  D. In this case the disjunct corresponding to
q in (B.6) is T -provably equivalent to absurdity and may be omitted. Suppose that q does
not witness T  A(m) → D, then, by Σ -completeness, T  ¬ProofT (q, A(m) → D).
So again we may omit the disjunct corresponding to q . Thus the whole disjunction of (B.6)
reduces to ⊥. We may conclude: T  C . Quod erat demonstrandum.
Remark B.1. Let’s assume that Γ is closed under disjunction. Let W be the theory
axiomatized by the axioms of T , plus the negations of false Γ -sentences. We use the
obvious formula for the axiom set ofW in T . We write ✷∗ for provability in W . Suppose
B is of the form ∃y B0. We write ∃ x B , for ∃y ∃x B0. Under these conventions we can
rewrite the specification of A as follows.
T  A(x)↔ ✷∗¬A(x) ≤ ∃ y✷∗¬A(y).
It would be interesting to see a modal treatment of our argument. 
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Appendix C. Derivable consequence
In this appendix, we provide reformulations of some of our results in terms of derivable
consequence. Let T be a theory and let τ be a signature. We define some consequence
relations for signature τ . Let Γ and ∆ be sets of sentences of the language of signature τ
and let A be a sentence of the language of signature τ .
• Γ | ∆ ∗T A :⇔ ∀K (T  ΓK ⇒ T +∆K  AK).• ∆ T A :⇔ ∅ | ∆ ∗T A.• Γ ∼T A :⇔ Γ | ∅ ∗T A.• ΛτT := {A | ∅ T A}.
Here it is implicitly assumed that the ‘K’ are interpretations for τ . (If τ is not clear from
the context, we will exhibit it as superscript.) is the relation of T -derivable consequence
and ∼ is the relation of T -admissible consequence. ΛτT is the predicate logic of T (for
signature τ ). For some remarks on admissible consequence, see [21, Appendix A]. For
some information about derivable consequence, see [20, Subsection 12.3]. For a study of
predicate logics of classical theories, see [23]. Here are some elementary facts about these
notions.
Fact C.1.
(1) Γ T A ⇔ ∀U ⊇ T Γ ∼U A.
Here ‘U’ ranges over theories with arbitrarily complex axiom sets.
(2) A τT B ⇔ ΛτT  (A → B).
(3) If T ✄τ A and A ∼τT B, then A τT B.
(4) We can find T, A, B, such that A ∼τT B, but not A τT B.
Proof. Ad (3). Suppose K : T ✄τ A and A ∼τT B . Consider any interpretation M for
τ . We construct a new interpretation P as follows: P is K if ¬AM and P is M if AM.
Clearly, P : T ✄τ A. By A ∼τT B , it follows that P : T ✄τ B . Ergo: T  (AM→ BM).
Ad (4). Let σ be the signature of arithmetic. We have ∧F ∧ con(T ) ∼σT ⊥, for any
T . This is, in fact, Pudla´k’s strong version of the Second Incompleteness Theorem. On the
other hand, if we take T e.g. PA, clearly
∧
F ∧ con(T ) #σT ⊥. 
A T -model N of signature τ , is a model for signature τ that is isomorphic to an internal
model of a model M of T . Internal models are given by interpretations K. We could call
the internal model of M given by K: KM. Thus, N is a T -model iff, for some model
M |= T and for some interpretation for signature τ , N is isomorphic to KM. We can
understand in terms of T -models, as follows.
Fact C.2. ∆ T A :⇔ for all T -modelsN , (N |= ∆⇒ N |= A).
Here is an example illustrating the non-compactness of ∼ .
Example C.3. Let σ be the signature of arithmetic. Let T be a finitely axiomatized,
consistent, sequential theory. Let U := F + {conn(T ) | n ∈ ω}. (Here, we can use
either the complexity measure ‘depth of connectives’ or the measure ‘depth of quantifier
changes’.) Then, since U is locally, but not globally interpretable in T , we find that ∼ is
not compact. 
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To provide an example to illustrate the non-compactness of , we need a result of Jan
Krajı´cˇek.
Theorem C.4. Let T = 〈T,N 〉 be I∆0 or let T be finitely axiomatized, consistent and
sequential. There is a mapping I → kI , from T -cuts to natural numbers, such that the
theory
kraj(T ) := T + {inconIkI (T ) | I is a T -cut}
is locally interpretable in T , and, hence, consistent.12 Here the complexity measure used
is depth of connectives. We can, however, also use depth of quantifier changes.
For a proof, see [6, Section 3]. The functionality suggested by our notation ‘kraj(T )’ is par
abus de langage, since the theory does not seem to be uniquely determined by the data. In
fact, I have the following conjecture.
Open Question C.5. Prove or refute the following conjecture. There are infinitely
many theories satisfying the description of kraj(T ) that are pairwise not mutually
interpretable. 
By construction, the theory kraj(T ) is not trustworthy. It follows from Theorem 5.9 that
kraj(T ) is not globally interpretable in T . We can now present the promised example for
the non-compactness of .
Example C.6. Let T = 〈T,N 〉 be I∆0 or let T be finitely axiomatized, consistent and
sequential. Let U := F + {conn(T ) | n ∈ ω}. Now it is easy to see that U kraj(T ) ⊥,
but that, for no finite subtheory U0 of U , we have U0 kraj(T ) ⊥. Hence,  is not
compact. 
Our notions have at most complexityΠ 02 . The following theorem shows that the worst may
happen.
Theorem C.7. There is a theory W such that ΛσW is complete Π 02 . Here σ is the signature
of arithmetic. It follows that∗,, ∼ andΛ assume their maximal possible complexities.
Proof. Let T = 〈T,N 〉 be I∆0 or finitely axiomatized, consistent and sequential. Let
W = 〈W,N 〉 := kraj(T ) as in Theorem C.4. We show that ΛσW is complete Π 02 .
Consider the sentence A := ∀x ∃y A0(x, y), where A0 ∈ ∆0. Let Sx := ∃y A0(x, y).
Let Rx be the FGH sentence forW and Sx . We define:
Q := ∀x (conx (T ) → Rx ).
We show that A iff ΛσW 
∧
F → Q.
Suppose that A. Let K be any interpretation for the signature σ . Consider the
interpretationM such that, in T ,M isK if (∧F)K andN , otherwise. Clearly,M : T✄F.
12 By inspecting the argument, it becomes clear that Krajı´cˇek’s theory is recursively enumerable. I did not
check that the axioms are indeed p-time decidable. However, we can always apply Craig’s trick to obtain a
p-time decidable axiomatization. Note that the verification of Craig’s trick demands a metatheory containing
Σ01 -collection.
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By Fact 2.2(3), there is a T -cut I of N , such that I ≤T M. By the construction of W , we
have ✷W inconIn(T ), for some n. It follows that ✷W inconMn (T ). We may conclude that
✷W ((
∧
F)K → inconKn (T )). It follows that (a):
✷W
((∧
F
)K → (∀x (conx (T )→ x < n))K
)
.
From A we can infer, for any k, that Sk . Hence Rk ∨ R⊥k . From Rk , we have, by Σ 01 -
completeness,✷W ((
∧
F)K → RKk ). In case, R⊥k , we have✷W Rk , by the definition of Rk ,
and✷W R⊥k , by Σ 01 -completeness. Hence✷W⊥, quod non. Ergo we find:✷W ((
∧
F)K →
(
∧
k<n Rk)K). Thus, we get (b):
✷W
((∧
F
)K → (∀x < n Rx)K) .
We may conclude, combining (a) and (b), that ✷W ((
∧
F)K → QK). Thus, ΛσW 
∧
F →
Q.
For the converse, suppose that ΛσW 
∧
F → Q. Consider any n. Pick a T -cut I such
that ✷W conIn(T ). By our assumption, we have✷W QI . Hence,✷W RIn and, so, ✷W Rn . By
the FGH Theorem, we may conclude that Sn . 
We show how various notions of this paper can be formulated in a natural way in terms of
derivable and admissible consequence. Let σ be the signature of arithmetic. We need the
following definitions.
• Let Tn be {0 = 0} if n = 0 and the set of true Π 0n -sentences otherwise.
• Suppose F ⊆ Γ . We define: Γ nT A :⇔ Γ ,Tn T A.
• Suppose F ⊆ Γ . We define: Γ ∼nT A :⇔ Γ | Tn ∗T A.
• T, n-conadm(U) iff not U ∼nT ⊥.
• T, n-con(U) iff not U nT ⊥.
We now have:
Fact C.8.
(1) T, n-conadm(U) implies T, n-con(U).
(2) T, n-con(U) iff there is a Σ 0n -sound T -model of U.
(3) A theory T is consistent and numerizable iff T, 0-conadm(F).
(4) If T, 0-con(Q), then T is undecidable. (This follows from Tarski’s Theorem that if an
essentially undecidable theory is interpretable in a consistent extension of a given the-
ory T , then T is undecidable. In fact T, 0-con(U) iff U is weakly interpretable in T .)
(5) Let T be finitely axiomatized, consistent and sequential. Then, we have T,
1-conadm(Q). (This follows from Theorem 4.1.)
(6) T is trustworthy iff T, 1-con(Q). (This follows from Theorem 5.5.) We may conclude
that T, 1-con(Q) implies T, n-con(Q), for all n.
Note that Q in the above statements can be replaced by F or S12 or I∆0, by the fact that
these stronger theories are interpretable on a cut in Q.
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Remark C.9. Consider a ∆b1-axiomatizable theory T satisfying T, 0-con(Q). By
Theorem 3.6, T is in Turing degree 0′. William Hanf showed that there are finitely
axiomatized T in any recursively enumerable Turing degree. (Even that there are
essentially undecidable, finitely axiomatized theories of any recursively enumerable degree
of unsolvability.) See [5]. Ergo, there are finitely axiomatized, undecidable theories T such
that T, 0-incon(Q). 
Appendix D. On the existential axioms of Q
In this appendix, we discuss a detail of the proof of Wilkie’s Theorem that I∆0 is
interpretable on an initial segment in Q. An initial segment, is a definable set of numbers
Q-provably closed under S and downwards closed under ≤.13
Our presentation is directly dependent on the presentation of Petr Ha´jek and Pavel
Pudla´k in their book [4, pp. 369, 370]. The reader is advised to first look at Ha´jek and
Pudla´k’s proof. The axioms of Q are the following.
Q1  Sx #= 0,
Q2  Sx = Sy → x = y,
Q3  x #= 0 → ∃y x = Sy,
Q4  x + 0 = x ,
Q5  x + Sy = S(x + y),
Q6  x × 0 = 0,
Q7  x × Sy = (x × y)+ x ,
Q8  x ≤ y ↔ ∃z z + x = y.
To prove Wilkie’s Theorem, it is convenient to take ≤ as a primitive symbol. If we would
take it as defined by ∃z z + x = y, then we would have to state explicitly that on an initial
segment I , the meaning of ≤ is preserved, i.e. that ≤I is equal to ≤  I . This sameness of
meaning is important, since we want downwards preservation ofΠ 01 -sentences to the initial
segment and upwards preservation of Σ 01 -sentences from the segment. These preservation
results are e.g. used to get initial segments with more and more∆0-induction.
Ha´jek and Pudla´k wisely choose to treat ≤ as a primitive symbol. However, on p. 369,
in their proof of Wilkie’s Theorem, they stumble in the last step. They write: “. . . we can
trivially interpret Q by eliminating ≤ from the language and deleting Q8”. In other words,
they redefine ≤. This argument won’t wash, since they need the new ≤ on the initial
segment to be the restriction of the old ≤ to the initial segment. Otherwise, the central
argument does not go through.
Fortunately the gap in the argument of Ha´jek and Pudla´k is easily closed by proceeding
analogously to their verification of Q3 on the initial segment I : prove, by induction on x ,
that ∀y≤ x ∃z≤x z + y = x . (We need some auxiliary inductions to show e.g. that x ≤ x
and x ≤ Sx .)
However, the problem to verify the existential axioms Q3 and Q8 also occurs in the case
of the interpretation of Ha´jek and Pudla´k’s theory Q+ in Q. For this reason, I prefer another
strategy to settle the problem of these axioms for once and for all, right from the start.
13 Our initial segment is Ha´jek and Pudla´k’s cut.
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We work in Q. We use the easily verifiable theorem that x + y = 0 → x = y = 0.
A number x is L-successive iff ∀y ∀z (y + z = x → Sy + z = Sx). We show that 0 is
L-successive. Suppose that y+ z = 0. Then y = z = 0. Moreover, Sy+ z = S0+0 = S0.
Next we show that the L-successive numbers are closed under successor. Suppose x is L-
successive and suppose y + z = Sx . We want to show that Sy + z = SSx . In case z = 0,
we have y = Sx and, hence, Sy+0 = Sy = SSx . In case y = Su, we have y+Su = Sx .
So, S(y + u) = Sx . Ergo y + u = x . Since x is L-successive, we have Sy + u = Sx and,
so, S(Sy + u) = SSx . We may conclude that Sy + Su = SSx .
A number x is a commutator iff ∀y ∀z (y + z = x → z + y = x). We say that x is
a strong commutator iff x is L-successive and x is a commutator. We already know that 0
is L-successive. Moreover, if y + z = 0, then y = z = 0, and, hence, z + y = 0. So 0
is a strong commutator. We show that the strong commutators are closed under successor.
Suppose x is a strong commutator. By the above argument, Sx is L-successive. Suppose
y + z = Sx . To show: z + y = Sx . First suppose z = 0. We have y = y + 0 = Sx . So
we need to show that 0 + Sx = Sx . We have x + 0 = x . So, since x is a commutator, we
find 0 + x = x and, hence 0 + Sx = Sx . Next, suppose z = Su. We have y + Su = Sx .
Then, y + u = x . Hence, since x is a commutator, we have u + y = x . Ergo, since x is
L-successive, Su + y = Sx .
Theorem D.1 (in Q). Suppose, that the elements of an initial segment I are all
commutators. Then, the segment I verifies Q3 and Q8.
Proof. Reason in Q. Suppose Sx is in I . We have x + S0 = Sx . Since, Sx is a
commutator, we find S0 + x = Sx . Ergo x ≤ Sx . Hence x ∈ I . Thus any non-zero
number in I has a predecessor in I .
Suppose x ≤ y, for y ∈ I . Then, for some z, z + x = y. Since, y is a commutator, we
find x + z = y, and so z ≤ y. Hence z ∈ I . 
Now we execute the remaining part of the proof of Wilkie’s Theorem inside the
strong commutators, without worries about Q3 and Q8. We need closure of the strong
commutators under successor to construct the appropriate initial segments.
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